FIRST SUPERVISORY NOTICE

ACTION

1.1
For the reasons given in this Notice, and pursuant to section 55J of the Act, the
Authority has decided to vary the permission granted to Coutts Automobiles
Limited (“CAL”), by removing all of its regulated activities with immediate effect.
Accordingly, CAL’s Part 4A permission no longer includes the following regulated
activities:

- Credit Broking;
- Debt Adjusting;
- Debt Counselling; and
- Agreeing to carry on a regulated activity


For the avoidance of doubt, this means that CAL must immediately cease
performing any of the above regulated activities.

REASONS FOR ACTION

2.1
On the basis of the facts and matters described in this Notice, the Authority is
taking the action set out in paragraph 1.1, for the following reasons:

- The Authority considers that CAL is failing to satisfy the threshold

condition set out in paragraph 2E (Suitability) of Schedule 6 to the Act;
and;

- The Authority considers that it is desirable to do so in order to advance the

Authority’s consumer protection objective (set out in Section 1C of the
Act) and the Authority’s integrity objective (set out in Section 1D of the
Act.

2.2
CAL and its employees are subject to investigation by law enforcement agencies
resulting in a series of events which include: the arrest of a senior employee; the
execution of search warrants CAL’s premises; the seizure (by law enforcement) of
cash and other items from its premises; litigation to repossess high value vehicles
from CAL. A number of bank accounts that CAL used for the purposes of its
business have been closed by its banks. CAL has failed to notify the Authority of
these matters despite the fact that it was clearly obliged to inform the Authority
by virtue of its obligations under SUP 15 and Principle 11.

2.3
Further, CAL submitted false documents to Firm J (a lender also regulated by the
Authority) in connection with applications for finance connected to the purchase
of high value vehicles by CAL or by customers for whom CAL was acting as a
broker.

2.4
In the light of the ongoing law enforcement proceedings and CAL’s willingness to
provide false documents for the purpose of obtaining finance, it appears to the
Authority that CAL has put itself at risk of being used for the purposes of financial
crime or of being otherwise involved in crime.

2.5
Based on the conduct detailed in paragraphs 2.2 to 2.4 the Authority concludes
that CAL is not a fit and proper person. It is therefore necessary for its Part 4A
permission to be varied with immediate effect so as to further the Authority’s
operational objectives of protecting consumers and enhancing the integrity of the
UK financial system. .

2.6
Where a firm appears to be involved in financial crime and where it is not meeting
the threshold conditions, it is appropriate for the Authority to exercise its powers
on an urgent basis to ensure that consumers are protected and the integrity of
the market is maintained.

DEFINITIONS

3.1
The definitions below are used in this Notice.

“the Act” means the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000;

“the Authority” means the body corporate previously known as the Financial
Services Authority and renamed on 1 April 2013 as the Financial Conduct
Authority;

“the Handbook” means the Authority’s Handbook of current rules and guidance;

“the
Register”
means
the
Financial
Services
Register,
published
at

https://register.fca.org.uk/;

“Bank 1” means a particular authorised UK bank;

“Bank 2” means a particular authorised UK bank;

“CAL” means Coutts Automobiles Limited;

“CF8” means the Apportionment & Oversight function as defined in the Handbook
at SUP 10A.7;

“COND” means the part of the Handbook that contains guidance on the Threshold
Conditions;

“the Director” means the director of CAL;

“EDF Energy” means EDF Energy Customers Limited, a company supplying
electricity and gas to customers in the UK;

“Firm J” means an authorised independent finance lender;

“Mr A” means the manager of CAL;

“Mr C” means a salesperson at CAL;

“Mr H” means a customer of CAL;

“Mr S” means a potential claimant for cash seized from CAL’s premises;

“Mr T” means a potential claimant for cash seized from CAL’s premises;

“NCA” means the National Crime Agency;

“Part 4A Permission” means the permission granted to CAL, pursuant to Part 4A of
the Act, to carry on regulated activities;

“Principle(s)” means the Authority’s Principles for Businesses, contained in the part
of the Authority’s handbook entitled “PRIN”;

“POCA 2002” means the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;

“SUP” means the part of the Handbook entitled “Supervision”;

“Thames Water” means Thames Water Utilities Ltd, a company responsible for
water supply in the Greater London area;

“Threshold Conditions” mean the threshold conditions set out in Part 1B of
Schedule 6 to the Act; and

“the Tribunal” means the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber).

FACTS AND MATTERS

Background

4.1
CAL was incorporated on 16 April 2015. CAL specialises in selling high value and
rare automobiles manufactured by brands such as Rolls Royce, Aston Martin and
Lamborghini. The Director is CAL’s sole director and was appointed on the date of
incorporation. The Director also holds the CF8 controlled function at CAL.

4.2
CAL has been authorised by the Authority since 26 August 2015. It has part 4A
permission to carry out various credit related regulated activities, namely:

- Credit Broking;
- Debt Adjusting;
- Debt Counselling; and
- Agreeing to carry on a regulated activity

4.3
CAL’s registered address at Companies House is 40 – 44 Western Avenue, London
W3 7TZ. This is also its principal place of business on the Register and is also the
location of the showroom at which it displays the luxury cars it offers for sale.

4.4
Mr A is the manager of CAL, attending meetings with the Director, and playing a
leading role in brokering deals and arranging the purchase of vehicles by CAL. CAL
has other employees, including Mr C, a salesperson.

Failure to make appropriate notifications to the Authority

4.5
Principle 11 requires a firm to be open and cooperative in its dealings with the
Authority and to disclose to the FCA anything relating to the firm of which the FCA
would reasonably expect notice. Further, Chapter 15 of SUP includes detailed rules
and guidance on information that a firm should provide to the Authority.

4.6
In particular, SUP 15.3.1R states that a firm must notify the Authority immediately
if it becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests that, the firm is
failing to satisfy one or more of the threshold conditions, or any other matter which
could affect the firm’s ability to continue to provide adequate services to its
customers and which could result in serious detriment to a customer of the firm or
of any matter which could have significant adverse impact upon the firm’s
reputation.

4.7
The Authority considers that CAL is in breach of its obligations under SUP 15.3.1R
and Principle 11 because it has failed to notify the Authority of the matters set out
in paragraphs 4.8 to 4.24 below. The Authority considers that the Director knew or
should have known about these matters.

4.8
On 9 June 2016, the NCA arrested Mr A and Mr C on suspicion of involvement in
serious criminal offences. Mr A is a manager at CAL, with significant influence in
the running of the business. Mr C worked at CAL as a salesperson. Both men were
released on bail by the NCA. The Authority would have expected notification of this
matter pursuant to SUP 15 and Principle 11 because it is a matter which could have
a significant adverse impact upon CAL’s reputation. However, the Authority has
never been notified by CAL that two of its employees were arrested and remain on
bail for serious criminal offences.

4.9
The NCA obtained a search warrant for CAL’s premises (at 40 – 44 Western
Avenue). This was executed on 23 February 2017. A copy of the search warrant,
listing the reasons for the search and the items sought, was left at the premises.
The warrant was executed during business hours, with staff including Mr A and Mr
C present. This is a matter which could have a significant adverse impact upon
CAL’s reputation and one that should have raised concerns at CAL that its business
had been used or may be used for criminal purposes. Therefore, the Authority

would have expected notification of these matters pursuant to SUP 15 and Principle
11. However, the Authority has never been notified of these matters.

4.10 Whilst on the premises of CAL, the NCA discovered that within the strong room safe

was £80,000 in £50 notes. The safe in the manager’s office contained: $72,000 in
$100 notes; €3900; 11,500 Moroccan Dirhams; and 3300 UAE Dirhams.
Counterfeit monies with a purported value of £1300 were also found within the
manager’s office, within a desk. Mr C denied knowledge of the monies. Mr A was
questioned about the origins of the funds. He claimed that the £80,000 belonged to
his client/friend Mr S, and represented the proceeds of gambling. Mr A told the NCA
that the $72,000 represented the proceeds from the sale of a high value watch.

4.11 Mr A’s answers caused the NCA officers to form a reasonable suspicion that the

monies were recoverable property for the purposes of POCA 2002 and were
intended to be used in unlawful conduct. The cash was seized from Mr A, who
received and signed the necessary paperwork.

4.12 The seizure of cash from CAL’s premises is a matter which could have a significant

adverse impact on CAL’s reputation and, further, is a clear indicator that CAL had
been used or may have been used for the purposes of financial crime. Therefore,
the Authority would have expected notice to be given pursuant to SUP 15 and
Principle 11. However, the Authority has never been notified of these matters.

4.13 The NCA commenced court proceedings and sought orders for the continued

detention of the cash, pursuant to POCA 2002, with hearings on 23 May 2017 and
23 November 2017. Mr A was a named party in the proceedings as the individual
from whom the funds were seized (though the funds were seized from CAL’s
premises). Mr A remained a senior employee of CAL throughout the proceedings.

4.14 In the course of the NCA’s cash detention/forfeiture proceedings, Mr A (or his legal

representatives) was served with documentation setting out: details of the NCA’s
investigation as it related to CAL; evidence obtained to date; reasons for suspicion
that the monies seized from CAL’s offices were linked to criminal offences; and
grounds for detention. After the hearings, copies of the court orders would have
been served on Mr A (or his legal representatives).

4.15 Mr S initially tried to claim the £80,000 as gambling proceeds. Further

investigations by the NCA concluded that the evidence did not support his claims
and he withdrew his claim on 23 December 2017. Mr T claimed that the $72,000
represented the proceeds of the sale of a high value watch. However, NCA
investigations revealed that the watch had been stolen before it was purportedly
sold by Mr T and on 16 April 2018, Mr T withdrew his claim to the money.

4.16 The £80,000 was permanently forfeited by court order on 21 May 2018. The

$72,000 has also been paid out, pursuant to POCA 2002, to a legitimate watch
dealer who was unaware the watch was stolen and who lost money as a result of
purchasing the watch from Mr T for onward sale. These court applications were
notified to Mr A (or his legal representative), along with paperwork providing
details about the failure of Mr S and Mr T to establish that the funds were
legitimate.

4.17 The POCA proceedings and the subsequent discovery that proceeds of stolen goods

had been stored on CAL’s premises are matters that could have a significant
adverse impact upon CAL’s reputation. They are matters that should have caused
CAL to consider whether it had been used for the purpose of financial crime or

otherwise of being involved in crime. Despite this CAL did not notify the Authority
of these matters.

4.18 On 7 December 2017, the Metropolitan Police executed a search warrant at 40 – 44

Western Avenue. As with the NCA’s raid, a copy of the search warrant would have
been left at the premises.

4.19 The Metropolitan Police were (and are) investigating CAL’s alleged direct

involvement in serious criminal offences.

4.20 The investigation of serious criminal offences by the police is a matter which could

have a significant adverse impact on CAL’s reputation. These matters also suggest
that CAL has been or may have been used for criminal purposes.

4.21 Further, witness statements detailing CAL’s involvement in serious criminal

offences were served on CAL in November 2018 as part of civil proceedings to
repossess a number of high value vehicles. The litigation is on-going. CAL has
never notified the Authority of these proceedings or of the serious criminal
allegations made against it. The Authority would have expected notification of
these matters pursuant to SUP 15 and Principle 11.

4.22 CAL had business banking relationships with, inter alia, Bank 1 and Bank 2. On 30

May 2018, Bank 1 wrote to CAL, stating that “a thorough review” had been
conducted of its banking relationship with CAL and that an irrevocable decision had
been taken to cease providing banking products and services and to close the
(four) business banking accounts CAL held. , Three of CAL’s accounts were closed
on 3 August 2018 and one other was closed on 23 August 2018.

4.23 On 3 July 2018, Bank 2 wrote to CAL and stated that “following a review of your

account(s) with us and after careful consideration, we are unable to continue to act
as your bankers”. CAL’s accounts were formally closed on 17 August 2018. The
balance of the account, £202,868.51, was retained by Bank 2.

4.24 The closure of CAL’s bank accounts could have adversely affected the services it

provided to its customers, in that CAL’s ability to effect transactions required for
the normal running of its credit broking business could have been seriously
impaired. The Authority would have expected notification of these matters pursuant
to SUP 15 and Principle 11.

Concerns that CAL has been used for the purposes of crime

4.25 As stated above, the Metropolitan police are investigating CAL for a variety of

criminal offences, though no findings have been made. However, in relation to the
NCA’s investigation, a large amount of cash was found on CAL’s premises, placed
there by or with the knowledge of Mr S, and:

a. Some of the funds transpired to be the proceeds of stolen property;

b. The remainder was forfeited pursuant to POCA 2002 because its

provenance could not be ascertained.

These matters raise concern that the firm has been used for the purposes of
criminal activity.

4.26 Further, CAL provided false information to a finance provider, Firm J, on a number

of occasions as set out in paragraphs 4.28 to 4.37 below. Providing false
information to obtain credit demonstrates a lack of integrity and potentially
undermines the effectiveness of the due diligence financial/lending institutions are
required to undertake to mitigate against the risk of financial crime.

Provision of false documents in support of finance applications

4.27 In light of the matters set out below, the Authority considers that CAL submitted

false documents in relation to five separate applications it made to obtain finance,
and considers it reasonable to infer that CAL did so knowingly. This is because

a. CAL itself was the beneficiary of the deception, in that the documents were

provided in order to help CAL to either prove ownership of a vehicle it
intended to sell and/or obtain finance to refinance its borrowings on
existing vehicles, and all the false documents were sent from CAL’s
corporate email address;

b. A senior employee, Mr A, appears to be responsible for sending the

majority of the documents; and

c. The majority of the documents related to The Director.

McLaren P1

4.28 A Mr H purportedly agreed to purchase this high-value car from CAL in 2017. CAL

then introduced Mr H to Firm J, to whom he made an application to borrow
£2,000,000 to pay the purchase price.

4.29 By an email dated 19 October 2017, CAL sent an invoice and bank statement to

Firm J to prove its ownership of the car it had agreed to sell to Mr H. The relevant
documents were:

a. An invoice purportedly issued by the vendor to record the purchase by CAL

of the McLaren P1, dated 12 May 2017. The McLaren P1 is identified with
reference to its UK registration plate. However, documentation for the
vehicle records that it was not registered in the UK (and thus allocated a
registration number) until September 2017, several months after the date
of the invoice; and

b. A bank statement purportedly demonstrating CAL’s bank transfer, to the

vendor, of the purchase price recorded in the above invoice. By a letter
dated 9 November 2018, Bank 1 confirmed to the Authority that the bank
statement does not match its records, and the Authority infers from this
that the statement is not genuine.

CAL benefitted from the deception, because it allowed Firm J to lend the funds to
Mr H to purchase the vehicle from CAL. These documents related to CAL’s
ownership of the vehicle, rather than Mr H himself.

4.30 In March 2018, CAL made an application to Firm J for finance for an amount of

£750,000, secured against this vehicle. The Director and Mr A held a meeting of the
board of directors (at which only Mr A and the Director were present) and approved
the application. Both the Director and Mr A provided individual personal guarantees
to Firm J to secure the finance for CAL. The Director signed the finance agreement.

4.31 Firm J’s application process required the applicant/guarantor to provide proof of

their address. By an email dated 15 March 2018, Mr A sent to Firm J, from a CAL
email address, a copy of documents purporting to be proofs of address for himself
and The Director (a Thames Water bill and an EDF Energy bill, respectively). By a
letter to the Authority dated 1 November 2018, Thames Water confirmed that the
“bill” is not a genuine document. By a letter to the Authority dated 19 November
2018, EDF Energy confirmed that the “bill” is not a genuine document.

4.32 CAL benefitted from the deception as the application was successful and the funds

were paid out to CAL on 16 March 2018. Further, Firm J used the proof of address
documents sent by Mr A on 15 March 2018 when assessing an April 2018
application by CAL to refinance its existing borrowings (from Firm J) in respect of a
Lamborghini Aventador (see below). The Director signed the finance agreement on
behalf of CAL on 20 April 2018 and the funds were released to CAL on 25 April
2018.

4.33 In April 2017, CAL made an application to Firm J to borrow £350,000, secured

against this vehicle. The Director signed the finance agreement on behalf of CAL
and Mr A sent the agreement to Firm J on 19 April 2017 (from CAL’s corporate
email address). Attached to the same email was a document purporting to be an
EDF Energy bill in The Director’s name, to serve as proof of address.

4.34 By a letter to the Authority dated 19 November 2018, EDF Energy confirmed that

this document is not genuine. CAL benefitted from the deception because the
application was successful and the funds were released to CAL on 20 April 2017.

4.35 In January 2017, CAL made an application to Firm J to borrow £200,000, secured

against this vehicle. The Director signed the agreement and it was witnessed by Mr
A. By an email dated 9 January 2017, Mr A sent Firm J a copy of a document
purporting to be an EDF Energy bill in the Director’s name to serve as proof of
address.

4.36 By a letter to the Authority dated 19 November 2018, EDF Energy confirmed that

this document is not genuine. CAL benefitted from the deception because the
application was successful and the funds were released on 12 January 2017.

4.37 In November 2017, CAL made an application to Firm J for finance for an amount of

£40,000 to fund its purchase of this vehicle. The Director signed the agreement on
behalf of CAL. Firm J‘s credit file for this agreement holds a proof of address
document for The Director, namely a document purporting to be an EDF Energy bill

in the Director’s name. By a letter dated 19 November 2018, EDF Energy confirmed
that this document is not genuine.

FAILINGS

5.1
The regulatory provisions relevant to this Notice are set out in the Annex.

5.2
On the basis of the facts and matters set out above, the Authority considers that
CAL is not fit and proper having regard to all the circumstances. It appears to the
Authority that:

a. By repeatedly failing to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of

SUP 15 and Principle 11 in relation to serious matters of which the
Authority would reasonably expect to have been notified, CAL is failing to
satisfy the threshold condition in paragraph 2E of Schedule 6 of the Act
(Suitability). CAL’s affairs are not being conducted in an appropriate
manner (COND 2.5.1A(c)) and it is not complying with requirements
imposed upon it by Authority relating to the provision of information
(COND 2.5.1A(d)) – it is not being open, co-operative or demonstrating
that it is ready, willing and organised to comply with the requirements of
the regulatory system (COND 2.5.6G(1));


b. By repeatedly submitting false documents to Firm J in connection with

applications for finance, CAL has failed to act with integrity and, as a
result, CAL is failing to satisfy the threshold condition in paragraph 2E of
Schedule 6 to the Act (Suitability). CAL’s affairs are not being conducted in
an appropriate manner (COND 2.5.1A(1)(c)) and it has failed to minimise
the extent to which it was possible for its business to be used for a
purpose connected with financial crime (COND 2.5.1A(1)(g)).

c. the conduct detailed in (a) and (b) above in particular poses a risk to the

Authority’s operational objectives of protecting consumers and enhancing
the integrity of the UK financial system.

5.3 As a result of the serious concerns occasioned by CAL’s conduct, and the risks it

poses to the Authority’s operational objectives, it is appropriate and proportionate to
vary CAL’s Part 4A permission in the manner set out in paragraph 1.1 with immediate
effect, so as to prevent it from carrying on any regulated activities.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

6.1
This Notice is given under section 55Y(4) and in accordance with section 55Y(5) of
the Act and is being served on CAL at its place of business as last notified to the
Authority.

Decision maker

6.2
The decision which gave rise to the obligation to give this Notice was made by the
Deputy Chair of the Regulatory Decisions Committee.

Representations

6.3
CAL has the right to make written and oral representations to the Authority
(whether or not it refers this matter to the Tribunal).

6.4
The deadline for providing written representations and/or notifying the Authority
that CAL wishes to make oral representations is 9 January 2019, or such later date
as may be permitted by the Authority. The address for doing so is:

Lynn Cheesman
Decision-Making Committees Secretariat
Financial Conduct Authority
12 Endeavour Square
London
E20 1JN

The Tribunal

6.5
CAL has the right to refer the matter to which this Notice relates to the Tribunal.
Under paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal)
Rules 2008, CAL has 28 days from the date on which this Notice is given to it to
refer the matter to the Tribunal.

6.6
A reference to the Tribunal can be made by way of a reference notice (Form FTC3)
signed by or on behalf of CAL and filed with a copy of this Notice. The Tribunal’s
contact details are: The Upper Tribunal, Tax and Chancery Chamber, Fifth Floor,
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL (telephone: 020 7612 9730; email:
uttc@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk).

6.7
For further information on the Tribunal (including the power to vary time periods)
CAL should refer to the HM Courts and Tribunal Service website which will provide
guidance and the relevant form to complete. The relevant page on HM Courts and
Tribunal Service website can be accessed via the following link:

6.8
A copy of the Form FTC3 should also be sent to Sam Clyndes at the Financial
Conduct Authority, 12 Endeavour Square, London E20 1JN at the same time as
filing a reference with the Upper Tribunal.

Access to Evidence

6.9
Section 394 of the Act does not apply to this Notice.

6.10 CAL should note that section 391 of the Act requires the Authority, when the Notice

takes effect, to publish such information about the matter as it considers
appropriate.

Authority contacts

6.11 For more information concerning this matter generally, contact Sam Clyndes,

Enforcement and Market Oversight Division at the Authority (direct line: 020 066
9062 or email sam.clyndes@fca.org.uk).

6.12 If you have questions about the RDC procedure, you should contact Lynn

Cheesman (Tel: 020 7066 3192).

Elizabeth France
Deputy Chair, Regulatory Decisions Committee

ANNEX

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. The Authority’s operational objectives established in section 1B of the Act include

securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers (section 1C) and
protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system (section 1D).
The integrity of the UK financial system includes that system not being used for a
purpose connected with financial crime.

2. The Authority is authorised by section 55J of the Act to exercise the following

powers:

- to vary an authorised person’s permission where it appears to the

Authority that such a person is failing to satisfy the Threshold Conditions
(section 55J(1)(a)) or it is desirable to exercise the power in order to
advance […] one or more of its operational objectives (section 55J(1)(c));
and

- to vary such a permission by removing a regulated activity from those for

which the permission is given (section 55J(2)(a)(ii));

3. Section 55Y(3) of the Act allows such a variation to take effect immediately only if

the Authority, having regard to the ground on which it is exercising its own-
initiative power, reasonably considers that it is necessary for the variation to take
effect immediately.

4. Section 391 of the Act provides that, when a supervisory notice takes effect, the

Authority must publish such information about the matter to which the notice
relates as it considers appropriate. However, the Authority may not publish
information if, in its opinion, publication of the information would be unfair to the
person with respect to whom the action was taken or proposed to be taken or
prejudicial to the interests of consumers.

5. The Threshold Conditions represent the minimum standards which a firm is

required to satisfy, and continue to satisfy, in order to be given and to retain a
permission to carry on regulated activities. The relevant Threshold Conditions are
set out in Part 1B of Schedule 6 to the Act. Paragraph 2E of Schedule 6 to the Act
states that:

“A must be a fit and proper person having regard to all the circumstances,
including –

(c)
the need to ensure that A’s affairs are conducted in an appropriate
manner, having regard in particular to the interests of consumers and the
integrity of the UK financial system;

(d)
whether A has complied and is complying with … requirements made by
the [Authority] in the exercise of its functions … relating to the provision of
information to the [Authority] …

(g) the need to minimise the extent to which it is possible for the business

carried on by A, or to be carried on by A, to be used for a purpose
connected with financial crime

RELEVANT REGULATORY PROVISIONS

6. In exercising its power to vary a Part 4A permission, the Authority must have

regard to guidance published in the Handbook. The relevant main considerations
in relation to the action specified above are set out below.

7. Principle 11 (Relations with regulators) of the Principles, states that a firm must

deal with the Authority in an open and co-operative way and must disclose to the
FCA appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would
reasonable expect notice.


Duty to notify the Authority

8. SUP 15.3.1R of the Supervision Manual states that a firm must notify the

Authority immediately it if becomes aware, or has information which reasonably
suggests: that the firm is failing to satisfy one or more of the threshold
conditions; or any matter which could affect the firm’s ability to continue to
provide adequate services to its customers and which could result in serious
detriment to a customer of the firm; or of any matter which could have a
significant adverse impact upon the firm’s reputation.


Threshold Conditions

9. The part of the Handbook entitled “Threshold Conditions” (COND) gives guidance

on the threshold conditions. COND 1.2.3G provides that the Authority may
exercise its own-initiative powers under section 55J of the Act if, among other
things, a firm is failing to satisfy any of the Threshold Conditions.

10. COND 2.5.3G(1) states that, in certain circumstances, the Authority may consider

that a firm is not suitable because of doubts over the individual or collective
suitability of persons connected with the firm.

11. COND 2.5.4G(2) provides examples of the general considerations to which the

Authority may have regard when assessing whether a firm will satisfy, and
continue to satisfy, the suitability threshold condition. This includes whether the
firm conducts, or will conduct, its business with integrity and in compliance with
proper standards.

12. COND 2.5.6G provides examples of particular considerations to which the

Authority may have regard when assessing whether a firm will satisfy, and
continue to satisfy, the suitability threshold condition. These include: whether the
firm has been open and co-operative in all its dealings with the Authority (COND
2.5.6G(1)); whether the firm has contravened…any provisions of the…regulatory
system (COND 2.5.6G(4)).

13. EG 8.2.1 provides that the Authority will have regard to its statutory objectives

and the range of regulatory tools that are available to it, when it considers how it
should deal with a concern about a firm. It will also have regard to the
responsibilities of a firm’s management to deal with concerns about the firm or
about the way its business is being or has been run and the principle that a
restriction imposed on a firm should be proportionate to the objectives the FCA is
seeking to achieve.

14. EG 8.2.3 provides that the Authority will exercise its formal powers under section

55J of the Act where the Authority considers it is appropriate to ensure a firm
meets its regulatory requirements. EG 8.2.3(1) and (2) specifies that the
Authority may consider it appropriate to exercise its powers where it has serious
concerns about a firm or the way its business is being or has been conducted.

15. EG 8.2.6 gives examples of the circumstances in which the Authority will consider

varying a firm’s Part 4A permission because it has serious concerns about a firm,
or about the way its business is being or has been conducted. These include:

“(1) in relation to the grounds for exercising the power under section
55J(1)(a) or section 55L(2)(a) of the Act, the firm appears to be failing, or
appears likely to fail, to satisfy the threshold conditions relating to one or
more, or all, of its regulated activities, because for instance:

(b) the firm appears not to be a fit and proper person to carry on a
regulated activity because:

(i) it has not conducted its business in compliance with high standards
which may include putting itself at risk of being used for the purposes of
finance crime or being otherwise involved in such crime

(iii) it has breached requirements imposed on it by or under the Act
(including the Principles and the rules), for example in respect of its
disclosure or notification requirements, and the breaches are material in
number or in individual seriousness;

16. EG 8.3.1 provides that the Authority may impose a requirement so that it takes

effect immediately or on a specified date if it reasonably considers it necessary for
the requirement to take effect immediately (or on the date specified), having
regard to the ground on which it is exercising its own-initiative powers.

17. EG 8.3.2 provides that the Authority will consider exercising its own-initiative

power as a matter of urgency where (1) the information available to it indicates
serious concerns about the firm or its business that needs to be addressed
immediately; and (2) circumstances indicate that it is appropriate to use statutory
powers immediately to require and/or prohibit certain actions by the firm in order
to ensure the firm addresses these concerns.

18. EG 8.3.3 provides some examples of situations which may give rise to such

serious concerns. These include circumstances suggesting a serious problem
within a firm (or with a firm’s controllers) that calls into question the firm’s ability
to meet the threshold conditions or information indicating that a firm’s conduct
has put it at risk of being used for the purposes of financial crime, or of being
otherwise involved in crime (see also EG 8.3.4(6)).